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LOUD AND SOFT ANTI-CHEVRON DECISIONS
Michael Kagan*
This Article proposes a methodology for interpreting the
Supreme Court's long-standing inconsistency in the
application of the Chevron doctrine. Developing such an
approach is important because this central, canonical
doctrine in administrative law is entering a period of
uncertainty after long seeming to enjoy consensus support on
the Court. In retrospect, it makes sense to view the many cases
in which the Court failed to apply Chevron consistently as
signals of underlying doctrinal doubt. However, to interpret
these soft anti-Chevron decisions requires a careful approach,
because sometimes Justices are simply being unpredictable
and idiosyncratic. However, where clear patterns can be
discerned, and where these patterns can be explained by a
coherent doctrinal theory, there is good reason to use them as
a foundation for refining the Chevron doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Chevron doctrine, it seems, is in play.1 There are now two
Justices on the Supreme Court who have published opinions calling
the central, canonical doctrine in contemporary administrative law
an unconstitutional transfer of judicial authority to the executive
* Michael Kagan (B.A. Northwestern University, J.D. University of
Michigan Law School) is a Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.
1. See Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron's Retreat 1 (June 2,
2016), https://sls.gmu.edu/csas/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/06/Sharkey-In
-the-Wake-of-Chevron 5 2016.pdf ("It is time to take stock of Chevron's
retreat.").
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
branch.2 There are at least three other Justices who have called for
limitations on the doctrine's application to agency interpretations of
their own jurisdiction. 3 Another Justice has advocated a context-
specific approach in which Chevron would apply with less force in
some situations than in others.4 In King v. Burwell,5 a majority of the
Justices signed an opinion holding that Chevron's famous two-step
analysis is merely something "we often apply," and, in any case, is not
appropriate for matters of "deep economic and political significance." 6
The Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.7 decision famously called for courts to defer to an executive
branch agency when it interprets a statute that it administers.8 First,
a court should ask if congressional intent is clear from the statute.9
Second, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous .... the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction. .. ."10 The power of Chevron deference, in theory at
least, is that it calls on judges to affirm statutory interpretations
against their own best judgment as to how statutes should be
understood. Once the Chevron doctrine coalesced in the 1980s, it
seemed to enjoy consensus support on the Supreme Court.11
But then, in 2015, Justice Thomas published a broadside against
Chevron in Michigan v. EPA.12 This only represented one vote out of
nine, of course, but it was a notable vote. A decade earlier, Justice
Thomas had written the majority opinion in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services,13 one of the
Court's most robust articulations of the commandment for judges to
defer to administrative agencies. 14 But in 2015, Justice Thomas
derided his own prior majority opinion. 15 Then, in 2017, Justice
2. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-13 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
3. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 318 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
4. See id. at 308-09 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I say that the existence of
statutory ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that
Congress has left a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill because our
cases make clear that other, sometimes context-specific, factors will on occasion
prove relevant.").
5. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
6. Id. at 2488-89.
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. Id. at 842.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 843.
11. See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012)
(considering the Social Security Administration's interpretation of a statute and
determining that it was a permissible construction under the Chevron doctrine).
12. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
13. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
14. Id. at 980.
15. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712.
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Gorsuch replaced a Justice who had, for a long time, been Chevron's
most outspoken supporter on the Court. 16 Just a few months before
his elevation to the Supreme Court, then-Judge Gorsuch launched a
bold critique of Chevron, calling it "no less than a judge-made doctrine
for the abdication of the judicial duty."'17
This Article's purpose is to suggest a methodology for
understanding the Supreme Court's approaches to Chevron now that
Chevron's future is more in doubt. To be clear, this Article does not
predict Chevron's complete demise. There are still only two Justices
on record supporting its reversal. In fact, this Article is based on the
assumption that the Chevron doctrine will continue but that the
consensus period of its history is finished.' 8 Assuming that we are
now entering a period in which there will be much less certainty about
the doctrine's reach, the Court may be more willing to explicitly refine
the doctrine, to limit its application in certain ways, and to articulate
new exceptions.
To a great extent, the current analytical challenge in
administrative law is not new-it is just more out in the open. Since
the early days of the doctrine, the trouble with Chevron has been in
understanding why the Court does one thing in one case but another
thing in another case. The problem is not just that the Court has
sometimes explicitly indicated that there are exceptions to this
doctrine-the so-called "Step Zero," for example. 19  Instead, the
problem is that the Court far more frequently fails to follow Chevron's
normal two-step analysis in cases to which it seems to apply and then
does not explain why.20 Explaining this persistent inconsistency has
long been a preoccupation of administrative law scholarship. But
prior to 2015, no Justice had announced any desire to formally
abandon Chevron, and the dominant streams of administrative law
scholarship were reluctant to draw doctrinal conclusions from the
Justices' failure to practice what they preached.
16. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989). But see Aaron L. Nielson, Cf. Auer v.
Robbins, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 303, 303 (2017) (speculating whether Justice
Scalia was reconsidering Chevron at the end of his career); Adam J. White, Scalia
and Chevron: Not Drawing Lines, But Resolving Tensions, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 23, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/scalia-and-chevron
-not-drawing-lines-but-resolving-tensions-by-adam-j-white.
17. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
18. See Sharkey, supra note 1, at 5 (observing "[t]wo [f]orms of Chevron's
[r]etreat").
19. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 188, 208 (2006) ("The
major locus of the disagreement... has become much narrower. It involves the
threshold question whether Chevron is applicable at all ... ").
20. See id. at 199 ("In Judge Breyer's view, judicial review should be
specifically tailored to the 'institutional capacities and strengths' of the judiciary.
For that endeavor, the simple approach set out in Chevron was hopelessly
inadequate.").
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At least one scholar has recently suggested that the Court's
"failure to apply Chevron where it would seem to apply" should be
seen as a signal of reluctance about "a full-throated Chevron
doctrine."21 This theory has actually been around for quite some time,
as it was suggested in a pioneering empirical study of Chevron case
law in 1992.22 But it did not catch on and was not developed or
pursued consistently by most administrative law scholarship. Now
that Justices are expressing doubts and criticisms of Chevron more
openly, it makes sense to see the Court's long-term inconsistency in
its application in a different light. This Article aims to expand this
thesis into a more structured way of interpreting the many cases in
which the Court does not apply Chevron in the way that it likely
should.
Part II briefly traces the evolution and recent breakdown of the
Supreme Court consensus about Chevron deference and outlines
alternative ways scholars have tried to explain the Justices'
inconsistency in applying the doctrine. The prevailing views have
generally asserted that the Justices are committed to fundamental
principles undergirding deference, even if they are idiosyncratic (and
quite possibly biased) in their willingness to defer to agencies in
actual cases. However, the Court's inconsistency should also be seen
as a potential signal of lurking problems and doubts and thus can
provide guidance about how the doctrine might be refined in the
future.
The clearest expressions of doctrinal doubts are what can be
called "loud" anti-Chevron decisions, when judges actually articulate
a limitation on or a critique of the doctrine. This type of decision is
explained in Part III. The bigger difficulty concerns the many
decisions where the Supreme Court failed to apply Chevron when it
ostensibly should have mattered or applied it in such a way as to
render the doctrine irrelevant. These can appropriately be called
"soft" anti-Chevron cases. Part IV shows that these cases come in
several varieties. The degree to which they indicate doctrinal
discomfort depends on several factors that can be discerned by close
reading of the case law. When there are patterns in these cases that
can be explained by a convincing doctrinal theory, scholars and judges
should use them to articulate refinements to our understanding of the
Chevron doctrine.
II. REEXPLAINING CHEVRON'S INCONSISTENCY
Chevron has long been the ultimate canonical decision. The
doctrinal meaning typically attributed to the case has been much
more than anyone would have anticipated from reading the decision
21. Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication
Should Succeed, 81 Mo. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2016).
22. See infra text accompanying note 53 (discussing early Chevron research
by Thomas Merrill).
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itself.23  The Chevron doctrine actually developed through
interpretation by lower courts rather than from an immediate
understanding that the Supreme Court had issued a watershed
decision.24 In fact, it could be said that the Chevron doctrine would
more appropriately be termed the General Motors doctrine, in honor
of the D.C. Circuit decision that seems to have been the first to cite
and explain Chevron as a major change in administrative law.25
The Chevron doctrine is often expressed as a rigid algorithm-
the two steps-which makes any deviation by the Court quite
noticeable. 26 Yet, despite all the fanfare, it is now well known that
the Supreme Court itself applies Chevron inconsistently at best.27
Once this inconsistency became apparent, some leading scholars
sought to reframe Chevron as a looser set of jurisprudential principles
rather than a rigid formula.28 One influential illustration of these
efforts was Peter Strauss's conception of "Chevron space."29 More
than anything, the Court's inconsistency, mixed with its surface-level
devotion to the doctrine, turned Chevron into a kind of enigma. As
Michael Herz summarized the situation in 2015, "Despite all the
attention .... the 'Chevron revolution' never quite happens. This
decision, though seen as transformatively important, is honored in
23. See Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative
Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009) ("[A] canonical text takes
on its own metonymic meanings--sometimes quite apart from its literal textual
meaning-within the practice of constitutional law.").
24. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All:
The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2013).
25. Id. at 39-41 (discussing General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d
1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
27. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017) (describing a "trilogy of decisions" where
the Court sent "inconsistent signals" when applying Chevron); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1124-25 (2008) (offering statistics showing numerous times the Court
did not apply the Chevron doctrine even though it appeared applicable); Michael
Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2015)
(observing that members of the Court "do not defer as much as the doctrine seems
to require'); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon,
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency
Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1805 (2010) (finding that Justices
apply Chevron differently in different contexts).
28. Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 27, at 1766 ("Chevron and the other
formal deference regimes have the following characteristics in practice: They are
flexible rules of thumb or presumptions deployed by the Justices episodically and
not entirely predictably, rather than binding rules that the Justices apply more
systematically.").
29. See generally Peter L. Strauss, "Deference"Is Too Confusing-Let's Call
Them 'Chevron Space" and 'Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012).
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the breach, in constant danger of being abandoned, and the subject of
perpetual confusion and uncertainty."30
Even if just for a time, all the Justices were committed to
deference at a general level. Even if most remain so today, the details
of the doctrine were not fully thought out by the Court at the
beginning. Chevron was originally just a case about air pollution. As
Gary Lawson and Stephen Kam explain in their history of how the
Chevron decision became the Chevron doctrine, "[T]he process by
which Chevron became law-a series of lower court decisions and
then default acceptance in the Supreme Court-
prevented... ambiguities from being vented and resolved in an
authoritative forum; instead, they remain to this day largely
submerged and unaddressed."31 This process made Chevron unusual
for a case of its stature. Typically, when the Court makes a
blockbuster decision, such as in Citizens United v. FEC32 or Obergefell
v. Hodges,33 the big question that the Court has to decide is
understood well in advance. The issue is fully briefed in the litigation
and has likely been hashed out in the lower courts. But that did not
really happen with Chevron deference. 34 Instead, it might be said
that the hashing out has taken place in the three decades since the
Supreme Court's decision.
One of the interesting subtexts with Chevron, at least during its
heyday, was that Justices on the conservative wing of the Court were
powerful proponents for judicial deference to the administrative
state.35 If one assumes that, in terms of political ideology, liberals are
more likely to favor empowering government regulatory agencies,
then the entire conception of Chevron deference would seem to be far
more appealing to liberals. After all, Chevron itself was about
deferring to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), albeit in
a Reagan-era case in which the EPA had issued a policy more
favorable to the energy company. 36 Justice Scalia, who was not on
the Court when Chevron was decided, played a key role in trumpeting
its importance and reexplaining its foundations. 37 Justice Thomas
30. Herz, supra note 27, at 1867.
31. Lawson & Kam, supra note 24, at 6.
32. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
33. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
34. See Lawson & Kam, supra note 24, at 32-33.
35. See Eskridge, Jr., & Baer, supra note 27, at 1154 (showing that
conservative Justices who served when Chevron was decided in 1984 agreed with
agency interpretations between 60.9% and 81.3% of the time).
36. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837
(1984).
37. Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era ofAdministrative Law: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States
v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 302 (2002).
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wrote the Brand X decision,38 which represents one of the doctrine's
high water marks.
This political dynamic made the apparent consensus around
Chevron all the more remarkable. One way to understand this is that
Justice Scalia was able to reframe deference to government agencies
as a form of judicial restraint. 39 In his influential 1989 lecture on
administrative law, he argued that the best justification for deference
was respect for implicit congressional intent.40 He argued that when
a statute is ambiguous, the interpretation may involve a policy
choice.41 Justice Scalia stated, "Under our democratic system, policy
judgments are not for the courts but for the political branches."42 In
this way, deference is less about the virtues of administrative
agencies than it is about judicial modesty. The Court eventually
embraced this rationale in United States v. Mead Corp.43
The longstanding apparent consensus on the Court meant that
understanding the Chevron doctrine became a primary obsession of
administrative law scholarship. As Michael Herz recently advised,
"At this point, it takes chutzpah to write about Chevron. Everyone is
sick to death of Chevron, and four gazillion other people have written
about it, creating a huge pile of scholarship and precious little left to
say."44 Moreover, it seemed that anyone hoping to offer relevant
commentary had to accept Chevron as a starting point, even though
scholars documented early on that the Justices themselves often did
not focus on it in routine administrative law cases. 45
The Court implicitly admitted its own inconsistency in King v.
Burwell, saying that the two-step Chevron analysis was merely a tool
that it "often" applies. 46 That is not a ringing endorsement of the
doctrine, and it arguably overstates the Court's actual usage of
38. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 968-69, 972 (2005).
39. See Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 27, at 1732-33 (speculating that
Justice Scalia's willingness to promote deference to the administrative state may
have been related to policy preferences that were supported by Republican
presidential administrations).
40. Scalia, supra note 16, at 516.
41. Id. at 515.
42. Id.
43. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 229 (2001) ('We hold that administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law .... Congress... may not have
expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular
provision or fill a particular gap.').
44. See Herz, supra note 27, at 1867.
45. See Eskridge, Jr., & Baer, supra note 27; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) ("[T]he Chevron
framework is used in only about half the cases that the Court perceives as
presenting a deference question.').
46. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).
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Chevron.47  Nevertheless, the doctrine remained central to
administrative law. The lower courts tended to be more dutiful about
citing and applying Chevron.48 Even at the Supreme Court, lawyers
often simply ignored the Court's actual tendencies. The Solicitor
General would routinely tell the Justices that Chevron applied to a
certain agency decision because the Court had said so in previous
proceedings but would ignore the sometimes longer list of similar
cases where the Court ignored Chevron.49
In the realm of scholarship, the most influential explanation for
the Court's inconsistency stresses the judicial values at the heart of
judicial deference while simultaneously lowering expectations for
perfect adherence. While the emphasis and nuance differed with
other writers, there existed a general skepticism that the doctrine
should, in fact, be understood as a rigid two-step algorithm, even
though the Court articulated it as such. Instead, Chevron should be
understood as a canon of interpretation5 0 or as a commitment to
loosely give agencies enough "space" to administer public policy.51
These arguments for a looser approach to deference compliment
advisories from other scholars who remind us that judges are human
and that "scholars are being unrealistic when they demand that the
Supreme Court adopt and consistently apply formal deference
regimes .... "52
However, there was always another broad explanation for the
Supreme Court's inconsistency: the Justices were never quite as
devoted to Chevron as they seemed. This is what Thomas Merrill, one
of the earliest scholars to document the Court's inconsistency, wrote
during Chevron's first decade: "[T]he failure of Chevron to perform as
expected can be attributed to the Court's reluctance to embrace the
draconian implications of the doctrine for the balance of power among
the branches, and to practical problems generated by its all-or-
nothing approach to the deference question."53 This thesis fits easily
with substantive critiques of the Chevron doctrine that are now seen
47. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 27, at 1 (summarizing research
showing how little impact Chevron seems to have at the Supreme Court).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent at 45, Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619
(2016) (No. 14-1096) (arguing that "principles of Chevron deference apply when
the BIA interprets the immigration laws" but not discussing other immigration
cases (arising from the BIA) where the Court had not mentioned Chevron, e.g.,
Charachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), and Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), among others (quoting Scialabba v. Cuellar de
Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (plurality opinion))).
50. Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 27, at 1727 (finding that Justices apply
Chevron "episodically" but that such application "reflect[s] deeper judicial
commitments').
51. Strauss, supra note 29, at 1143.
52. Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 27, at 1735.
53. Merrill, supra note 45.
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expressed openly by some Justices. 54 The seeds of today's dissension
can be seen lurking even in the doctrine's formative days. A less often
cited part of that 1989 Scalia lecture acknowledged that there are
fundamental reasons to be skeptical of judicial deference:
It is not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept
the judgment of an executive agency on a question of law.
Indeed, on its face the suggestion seems quite incompatible with
Marshall's aphorism that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."55
More recently, that same reference to Justice Marshall's opinion in
Marbury v. Madison56 was a central feature in Justice Thomas's and
Justice Gorsuch's attacks on Chevron.57
Nevertheless, this thesis had a problem. It took quite some time
for any Justice on the Court to actually voice doubts about Chevron
openly. Moreover, there were cases where the Court had explicitly
supported the use of Chevron.58 One can thus understand lower
courts' widespread adoption of the Chevron doctrine. But eventually,
cracks began to appear. In City of Arlington v. FCC,59 three Justices
dissented from the idea that agencies are owed deference when they
interpret the boundaries of their own mandates.6 0 Justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinion,61 leading Chevron to another of its peaks.
But three years later, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito and
Thomas, questioned Auer deference, 62 under which the court should
defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation as articulated
in Auer v. Robbins.6 3
Current doubts about Chevron coincide with a general trend
toward judicial empowerment vis-A-vis administrative agencies. 64
While the critiques from Justice Thomas and now Justice Gorsuch are
the most far reaching, Christopher J. Walker has suggested that it is
54. Scalia, supra note 16, at 513.
55. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124 (2016)
(describing interpretation deference as being "implemented by the two-step
analysis set forth in Chevron").
59. 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
60. Id. at 312, 318 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 292.
62. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
63. 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1997).
64. See Note, The Rise of Purposivism and the Fall of Chevron: Major
Statutory Cases in the Supreme Court, 130 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1243-45 (2017)
[hereinafter The Rise of Purposivism].
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possible that Chief Justice Roberts has his own issues with Chevron.65
Writing about the major questions exception, which the Chief Justice
used in King v. Burwell, Walker noted that in 2013, Chief Justice
Roberts disagreed with Justice Scalia about whether an
administrative agency should receive deference when it is
interpreting the boundaries of its own authority.66 Sounding much
like a critique of Chevron, the Chief Justice worried about the "vast
power" of the administrative state over everyday life.67 He was joined
in this critique by Justices Kennedy and Alito. As Walker writes,
"Perhaps the narrowing of Chevron deference in King v. Burwell
was ... the start of a much more systemic narrowing of Chevron's
domain and the Chief Justice's attempt to relitigate the battle he
previously lost to Justice Scalia."6 s Walker noted that Justice Breyer
has also advocated a "context-specific" approach to deference, in
which the Court should not always presume that statutory ambiguity
warrants deference to an agency.69 Walker surmised that Justice
Breyer's context-specific approach might often be compatible with the
inclinations of the Chief Justice.7 0
To some extent, this is heavy on speculation. It is not the purpose
of this Article to predict exactly how the Court is going to behave with
regard to Chevron in the future. That would be a dangerous endeavor.
But there are some observable facts that cannot be ignored. Open
divisions about Chevron have appeared among the Justices. If one
counts King v. Burwell, all nine Justices have, at least once, signed
an opinion explicitly holding that Chevron should not apply in a
situation where the administrative law textbooks would previously
have said that it must apply. There also exists decades of Supreme
Court precedent in which the Court displayed apparent
inconsistency, occasionally opining that Chevron should be applied
but very often not doing so. 71 For scholars and practitioners, these
cases would seem to be a gold mine in terms of material helping us to
understand the cracks and doubts embedded in Chevron and to build
arguments about how the Court should refine the doctrine in the
future.
65. See Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron
Deference, 81 Mo. L. REV. 1095, 1097-98 (2016) (exploring Chief Justice Roberts's
more limited approach to Chevron deference).
66. See id. at 1103-04; see also City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 318 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 313.
68. Walker, supra note 65, at 1103.
69. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 307-08 (Breyer, J., concurring).
70. Walker, supra note 65, at 1104-05.
71. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995) (detailing how the Court's
use of textualist tools to the exclusion of other evidence of legislative intent leads
to inconsistent applications of the Chevron doctrine).
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III. LOUD DECISIONS
The first and most important type of Chevron case is one in which
either the Justices say explicitly that Chevron should be applied or
they openly criticize it or say that it should not be applied in a
particular situation. We can call these "loud" decisions. There is
probably no need to name them except to distinguish them from "soft"
decisions, which will be described in Part IV.
A short list of famous examples illustrates the category easily.
Among loud decisions, there is, first and foremost, the Chevron
decision itself, where the Court articulated the famous two-step
analysis. 72 In Mead, the Court reexplained Chevron with a stronger
orientation toward congressional intent and delegation of powers. 73
Then there is Brand X, where the Court extended deference to
administrative interpretations that go against prior judicial
interpretation of a statute.74 In a similar realm, Auer applied
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation,75 and
City of Arlington applied it to an agency's interpretation of its own
jurisdiction.76 Essentially, these are the cases a law student finds in
an administrative law class syllabus because they mark out the
extensive potential reach of the Chevron doctrine. Loud Chevron
cases also include the Step Zero decisions, where the Court explicitly
articulates situations in which Chevron should not apply. The major
questions exception in King v. Burwell is probably the most recent
prominent example of such a decision. In a similar manner, the D.C.
Circuit recently issued a decision holding that Chevron deference does
not apply until the government actually asks for it. 77
There have also been recent loud dissents and concurring
opinions announcing criticisms of Chevron, or at least of certain
applications of it. The Chief Justice dissented to deference with
regard to interpreting agency jurisdiction.78 Justice Scalia protested
Auer deference. 79 The loudest opinions have come from Justice
Thomas and Justice Gorsuch because they set out full-throated, fully
developed arguments.80 At the same time, it is important to
remember that there are some loud decisions that end up being
unimportant. For instance, in a 1987 immigration case, the Court
offered, as an apparent alternative holding, the theory that Chevron
72. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
73. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
74. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005).
75. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997).
76. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296-98 (2013).
77. See Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
78. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 318 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
79. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212-13 (2015) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
80. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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only applied when an agency applies laws to particular facts, not to a
pure question of law.81 This could have been an important limitation
on the doctrine, but the Court moved away from this idea quite
quickly.8 2 Thus, even explicit decisions by the Court are sometimes
false indicators of the direction in which the doctrine will actually
develop.
What is key in these loud decisions is that the Court is doing
something explicit about the Chevron doctrine, or at least an
individual Justice is saying something about the doctrine, and one
can begin to understand it by digesting the text of what is written on
the page. That does not mean that the rule is always easy to
understand. The major questions exception in King v. Burwell is
hardly spelled out with any real clarity, for example.8 3 But there is
no doubt that the Court announced an explicit limitation to Chevron
as part of its holding.8 4 But soft decisions, which are discussed in the
next part of this Article, require more careful analysis.
IV. SoFT DECISIONS-Two TYPES
Soft decisions applying-or not applying-Chevron are harder to
interpret, and while they are numerous, they take more work to
identify. These are cases where the textbook version of Chevron
would call for the doctrine's application, and yet the Court does not
do so, or does so in such a way as to render the doctrine irrelevant.
As a loose rule of thumb, a reader might ask this question: If a law
professor teaching an administrative law course had given students
an issue-spotting exam with the same fact pattern to test them on
their understanding of Chevron, would the professor be correct to
deduct points if students failed to mention Chevron in their answers?
In more doctrinal terms, would the Chevron doctrine as it has been
articulated in the Court's binding precedent require the application
of Chevron, and did the Court fail to do so?
The defining characteristic of these soft decisions is that the
Court explains neither what it is doing-or not doing-nor why. If
the Court had explained its approach, then there would be a loud
decision. For example, if the Supreme Court had decided King v.
Burwell without mentioning Chevron, it would have been termed a
soft anti-Chevron decision. This would not have changed the result,
but since the Court explained why it did not apply Chevron in that
case, it issued a loud decision-although readers can certainly dispute
how convincing the Court's explanation actually is.
81. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
82. See Merrill, supra note 45, at 986 ("By the end of the next Term, however,
the Court was again applying the Chevron doctrine (irregularly, as ever) to
questions of law, and Cardoza-Fonseca quietly dropped from sight.').
83. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
84. See id.
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Soft anti-Chevron decisions can be further divided into two types,
which will be called "silent" Chevron and "impotent" Chevron
decisions. Silent Chevron decisions simply do not mention Chevron
in a case where it would seem to be relevant. They are those cases in
which the Supreme Court simply acts like Chevron deference does not
exist. Because the Court does not even mention Chevron, a Westlaw
or Lexis search for Supreme Court decisions citing the doctrine will
not locate these cases. They can only be identified through
subsequent analysis and critique. By contrast, impotent Chevron
decisions are those where the Court acknowledges Chevron's
potential relevance, usually in passing, but renders the doctrine
impotent, meaningless, or irrelevant. Two recent immigration law
decisions will be used to illustrate both types.
The 2016 immigration decision in Torres v. Lynch8 5 illustrates
the silent variety of a soft anti-Chevron decision. Torres concerned
the definition of an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"), specifically whether a state crime that lacks
a federal jurisdictional element that is required in the federal
statutory definition-a connection to interstate commerce-
nevertheless categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony.8 6 More
specifically, the Court considered whether a New York conviction for
arson qualifies as a federal aggravated felony, even though the
relevant federal definition required that the damaged property be
"used in interstate or foreign commerce," a qualification absent from
the state statute.8 7 The agency-the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA)-said that it was an aggravated felony.88 However, normally
when a state crime is missing an element explicitly required in the
INA, the crime is categorically not a deportable offense.8 9 It was not
facially obvious from the statute that the jurisdictional element-
connection to interstate commerce-was distinct from the other
elements defining the crime. Moreover, there was a circuit split on
the question at hand.90 This situation-an ambiguous interpretive
question which had been answered by the relevant agency-would
normally call for the invocation of Chevron. However, while the
Supreme Court affirmed the BIA's interpretation, it did not defer to
it, and in its opinion mentioned neither Chevron nor, for that matter,
any other deference standard known to administrative law.91
Methodologically, there are several factors evident in Torres that
make the Court's silence regarding Chevron in the case more
meaningful. The fact that there was a circuit split is a strong
85. 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016).
86. Id. at 1623.
87. Id. at 1624.
88. Id.
89. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 1678, 1697 (2013).
90. See Torres, 136 S. Ct. at 1624 n.1 (summarizing the circuit split).
91. See generally id.
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indicator that reasonable people could come to different conclusions
about what the statute should mean, and thus, the statute was
objectively ambiguous on the question at hand. But if that were not
enough, the Supreme Court actually said, "Congress could have
expressed itself more clearly."92 Thus, the key triggers for deference
under Chevron were present. Two more important factors should be
noted: the lower court applied Chevron deference in the decision
under review and the government asked for the Supreme Court to
apply Chevron deference. 93 These factors matter, first, because they
reduce the chance that the Court's omission of Chevron could have
been a simple oversight 94 and, second, because the government's
failure to ask for deference could be itself a reason not to apply it.95
In sum, Torres is a strong example of a case where it should have
been expected that Chevron would apply, despite the Court choosing
to ignore it. This can be seen first and foremost by independent
analysis applying Chevron's two steps. But other factors can certainly
be considered: (1) whether the Supreme Court itself acknowledged
lack of statutory clarity; (2) whether lower court judges were divided
on the statutory meaning, providing an objective indication that the
statute's meaning was subject to reasonable disagreement; (3)
whether lower courts disagreed with the agency's interpretation,
similarly indicating room for reasonable disagreement; (4) whether
the lower court decision under review applied Chevron; and (5)
whether the government asked for deference to the agency's
interpretation.
The impotent Chevron variety is illustrated by a 2017
immigration case, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 96 in which the
Court again dealt with the statutory definition of an aggravated
felony in a deportation case. 97 In Esquivel-Quintana, the specific
question concerned whether certain state statutory rape offenses
qualified as "sexual abuse of a minor."98 The California statutory rape
offense at issue required only a three-year age difference when the
purported victim was under eighteen years old, thus criminalizing sex
between a twenty-one-year-old and a seventeen-year-old. 99 There
was a circuit split on this question. 100 Moreover, the lower court panel
92. Id. at 1633.
93. Brief for the Respondent at 7, 45-52, Torres, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (No. 14-
1096).
94. In Torres, the parties argued pointedly about whether deference should
apply. Brief for Petitioner at 47-49, Torres, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (No. 14-1096).
95. See Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(declining to apply Chevron deference when the government did not seek it).
96. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
97. See id. at 1567.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
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was divided on the question but had upheld the BIA.101 As in Torres,
the government asked for Chevron deference and the parties argued
over whether it should apply.102
In Esquivel-Quintana, the Court ruled for the immigrant, finding
that the conviction was not an aggravated felony because a statutory
rape offense could not constitute "sexual abuse of a minor" unless the
crime required that the victim be under sixteen years of age. 103 But
unlike in Torres, the Court actually mentioned Chevron in its
decision. In Esquivel-Quintana, the Court dispensed with Chevron as
follows:
[P]etitioner and the Government debate whether the Board's
interpretation... is entitled to deference under
Chevron.... We have no need to resolve whether the rule of
lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case because the
statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses the Board's
interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity nor Chevron
applies. 104
Because the Court said this, the simplest thing to do would be to say
that Esquivel-Quintana is a straight-forward Chevron Step One
decision. The statute was not ambiguous. But if this statute, which
caused division between the lower courts and the agency and which
hardly offers a self-evident meaning on its face, is not ambiguous, it
is difficult to imagine exactly what kind of statute would be
considered ambiguous. That is why Esquivel-Quintana can be
classified as a soft anti-Chevron decision.
An impotent Chevron case is not as strong an indicator of
Chevron's erosion as a silent Chevron case, since the Court at least
superficially acknowledges Chevron's potential relevance. But
examples like these cannot be ignored. Consider that in Torres, where
the Court did not even mention deference, the government actually
won.105 In Esquivel-Quintana, the Court noted Chevron's possible
relevance, if only to cast it aside, and the government lost.106 These
cases thus illustrate the well-documented phenomenon that "Chevron
deference-at least at the Supreme Court--does not seem to
matter."107
Torres and Esquivel-Quintana are consistent with a trend in
which the Court uses tools of textual analysis to find definite
meanings in facially ambiguous statutes and, in the process, asserts
101. Id.
102. Brief for the Respondent at 7, 12, 42, Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 1562
(No. 16-54).
103. Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572-73.
104. Id. at 1572.
105. Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1634 (2016).
106. Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572-73.
107. Barnett & Walker, supra note 27, at 4.
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a stronger judicial role in statutory interpretation.1 08 For example, in
Torres, the Court said that the central question is actually not
whether Congress could have written a clearer statute. 109 The Court
noted that "[t]he question is instead, and more simply: Is that the
right and fair reading of the statute before us?" 110  Torres and
Esquivel-Quintana could both be interpreted essentially as Chevron
Step One decisions. But that would seem to miss the point that
Chevron is not doing any real work in these cases and, as such, it does
not matter if the Court even mentions it. The more pertinent question
should be: Why is the Chevron doctrine so irrelevant to the Supreme
Court in cases that seem tailor made for it?
V. IDENTIFYING PATTERNS AND THEORIES
In administrative law scholarship, the category of cases that can
be called soft anti-Chevron decisions has long been used as the raw
data for empirical studies documenting the Court's inconsistency with
the doctrine.1 ' One of the most well-known of these studies, by
Connor Raso and William Eskridge, found that each of the Justices
was inconsistent in their application of Chevron, leading them to the
conclusion that the Justices do not really treat Chevron as a precedent
they are bound to follow in every case. 112 Instead, they treat it as a
canon "reflecting values whose weight will vary from case to case,
depending on context."113 Yet, Raso and Eskridge concluded that it
was difficult to predict how the Justices would apply these values.11 4
They concluded, "Idiosyncrasy in deployment (or not) of deference
regimes is tolerated within the Court."115 This conclusion comes quite
close to saying that the Court is simply arbitrary and it sits
uncomfortably with the contention that the Justices are actually
applying some deeper values to which they genuinely committed.
This cynicism is buttressed by empirical evidence that the Justices'
policy preferences predict their willingness to extend deference to
different agencies. 1 6
108. See The Rise of Purposivism, supra note 64 (observing a trend toward
judicial empowerment).
109. Torres, 136 S. Ct. at 1634.
110. Id.
111. See generally Merrill, supra note 45; Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 27.
112. Raso & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 27, at 1765-66.
113. Id. at 1765.
114. Id. at 1766 ("They are flexible rules of thumb or presumptions deployed
by the Justices episodically and not entirely predictably, rather than binding
rules that the Justices apply more systematically.").
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1784 ("Justices systematically support less deferential regimes for
policies with which they disagree.'); see also Kent Barnett et al., The Politics of
Invoking Chevron Deference 3-4 (Ohio State Pub. Law Working Paper No. 400,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2984302 ('When
courts reviewed liberal agency interpretations, all panels-liberal, moderate, and
conservative-were equally likely to apply Chevron.... But when reviewing
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Judges are, of course, human. They will not be perfect paragons
of consistency. But their fallibility and susceptibility to ideological
favoritism does not mean that there are no principled explanations
for their decisions to be discerned and no patterns to be found.
Rather, empirical studies on their own can only take us so far, in part
because they are only as good as the categories that they count. For
example, in a 2008 study, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer found
that the Supreme Court was more likely to defer to an agency in some
subject matter areas and less likely to defer to an agency in others.117
As it turns out, the Court seemed, on the whole, to be less likely to
defer in immigration than in many other areas of administrative
law.118 But Eskridge and Baer simply counted "immigration" cases,
a category that can raise many different kinds of legal problems.
To understand why this type of broad categorizing might hide an
important pattern, consider that in 2014, one year before ruling in
Torres, the Supreme Court decided another immigration case,
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio.119 In that case, the plurality decision
by Justice Kagan relied extensively on Chevron to deny family-based
visas under the Child Status Protection Act, affirming an agency
interpretation that led certain children to "age out" of eligibility.1 20
Cuellar de Osorio seems like a strong application of deference;
Kagan's opinion might be read to imply that she actually disliked the
policy outcome, because she made a point to remind the agency that
it could change course. 121 Thus, in Cuellar de Osorio, the Chevron
doctrine really seemed to matter to the Supreme Court. In Eskridge
and Baer's study, Cuellar de Osorio would be lumped into one
category along with Torres and Esquivel-Quintana, and the Court
would appear to be irredeemably inconsistent in how it applies
Chevron in immigration cases.
To a great extent, this is a result of sloppiness by the Justices in
explaining their own behavior. The plurality opinion in Cuellar de
Osorio wrote, "Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA
interprets the immigration laws."122 And yet, one year later in Torres,
the same Justices completely ignored Chevron in a case concerning a
BIA interpretation of immigration law.1 23  The Court's broad
statement does not help to explain the different results of cases like
Torres and Esquivel-Quintana. But that does not rule out the
conservative agency interpretations, liberal panels applied Chevron significantly
less frequently than conservative panels.").
117. Eskridge, Jr., & Baer, supra note 27, at 1144.
118. Id. at 1145.
119. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
120. Id. at 2196-97.
121. Id. at 2207 ("All that said, we hold only that § 1153(h)(3) permits-not
that it requires-the Board's decision to so distinguish among aged-out
beneficiaries.").
122. Id. at 2203.
123. See generally Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016).
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possibility that there were important differences between these cases
that explain and possibly justify the Justices' apparent inconsistency.
To put this another way, what if these cases really do not all
belong in the same category, even though they are each broadly about
immigration law? These are actually very different kinds of
immigration cases. Torres and Esquivel-Quintana were deportation
cases, involving interpretation of criminal grounds for deportation. 124
Cuellar de Osorio was about denying a visa to a person who had not
yet immigrated to the United States.125 Perhaps these differences
made the Justices more comfortable with deference in one context and
less comfortable in the other. Whether these distinctions matter in
the application of Chevron in different kinds of immigration cases can
be saved for a future study.126 My purpose here is simply to stress
that it is important to look for these patterns.
To do this, a methodology is needed. The first step is to identify
the loud and soft anti-Chevron decisions. The loud decisions are
typically self-evident, and the soft cases require an assessment of a
number of factors, as explained in Part IV. But identifying the cases
is only the beginning. A single anti-Chevron decision might not mean
much; it may simply show idiosyncratic behavior by a few Justices in
a particular case. But if a coherent doctrinal rationale that explains
a longer list of decisions can be discerned, it should be taken as a sign
that the Court is moving in a coherent doctrinal direction. The
Justices may not feel confident enough yet to articulate a refinement
of the doctrine, and they may yet reverse course, but that does not
mean they are just ignoring doctrinal concerns when they ignore
Chevron. Rather, they may be using their soft avoidance of Chevron
as a means of testing the doctrine's limits. They may be avoiding
applying deference when it does not seem to work well but when they
are not quite ready to explain why. It is important for scholars and
attorneys to recognize these patterns and explore the strengths and
weaknesses of theoretical explanations for them.
The methodology suggested is essentially an application of the
standard scientific method. The Court's decisions applying and not
124. See supra notes 86, 97 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
126. See Patrick Glen, Response to Walker on Chevron Deference and Mellouli
v. Lynch, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 20, 2015),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/response-to-walker-on-chevron-deference-and-mellouli-v
-lynch-by-patrick-glen (discussing the possibility of a "deportation-is-different"
explanation for the Court's reluctance with regard to Chevron); Michael Kagan,
Chevron's Immigration Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(June 10, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception
-revisited-by-michael-kagan/; Chris Walker, The "Scant Sense" Exception to
Chevron Deference in Mellouli v. Lynch, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(June 2, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-scant-sense-exception-to-chevron
-deference-in-mellouli-v-lynch-by-chris-walker/ (discussing the possibility that
the Roberts Court may be reluctant to give deference in certain deportation
cases).
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applying Chevron can be understood as an observed natural
phenomenon that may initially appear to be random. To make sense
of this data, researchers need to develop theories as to why the Court
might be less willing to apply Chevron in certain types of cases. Legal
scholars can argue whether these normative theories make sense.
But to understand what Supreme Court Justices are doing, these
theories need to be translated into predictive hypotheses: If a case
involves X, the Supreme Court will not rely on Chevron to decide the
case. If a case involves Y, Chevron deference will be highly important
to the Court's analysis. One can then turn to the Court's actual body
of decisions to see if the hypotheses are correct. If the actual results
are consistent with a hypothesis, and if the normative theory is
coherent, there will be a compelling case that a doctrinal shift is
emerging.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court explicitly announces an exception to
Chevron doctrine, as it did in King v. Burwell,127 it is obvious to
anyone who pays attention to administrative law that it has done
something important. It is possible that a decade from now will prove
the major questions exception to have been a huge change in the
application of deference to administrative agencies. It is also possible
that, in the long run, it will look like an anomaly that has little
enduring impact, like Justice Stevens's forgotten alternative holding
in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in 1987.128 But because the Court was
explicit that it was not applying Chevron, one knows to pay
attention. 129 It was loud.
When the Court speaks more softly about Chevron, by stripping
deference of any real force or by simply ignoring it, it is harder to
know what to think. Such cases are numerous and have been
extensively counted in empirical studies. But they have not been
parsed and analyzed for their doctrinal implications to quite the same
extent. This is only natural. The Court in these cases does not give
us much to analyze. Since, until recently, the Court seemed
superficially devoted to Chevron, it was perhaps sensible for
administrative law scholars to roll our collective eyes. Supreme Court
Justices are unpredictable and maybe a little unprincipled, and
perhaps that is all there is to it.
But now that the Chevron doctrine is entering a new phase of
doubt, there needs to be a closer look at the fact that this is a doctrine
that emerged in somewhat odd fashion and that the Supreme Court
127. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
129. See Walker, supra note 65, at 1100-01 ("The major questions doctrine is
not new.... But what distinguishes King from the prior cases is how the Chief
Justice invoked the major questions doctrine."); Sharkey, supra note 1, at 10
(noting that King v. Burwell enlarges Step Zero).
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never really applied as expected. Some of the Court's apparent
unpredictability in applying deference may actually follow patterns
to which spectators have not been adequately sensitive. The Court's
well-documented inconsistency in applying the Chevron doctrine may
be seen in retrospect as a means by which the Justices quietly have
worked through operational problems and doubts, which thus could
form the foundation for refinements to the doctrine.
There are many cases where the Court has ignored or minimized
Chevron. But to make too much out of any isolated instance of this
phenomenon can be dangerous. Sometimes Supreme Court
inconsistency is just inconsistency. The key is finding patterns.
When there is a strong pattern that can be explained by a coherent
and compelling normative or doctrinal theory, it may be time to urge
the Justices to make a louder statement. It may be, as administrative
law scholarship has long documented, that the importance of
deference doctrines at the Supreme Court level can be easily
overstated.130 But it has also long been clear that the lower courts do
seem to try more consistently to follow the Supreme Court's
instructions on deference. For this reason alone, it is important to
refine the Chevron doctrine so that lawyers and judges understand if
and how they are supposed to apply deference in different contexts.
Key to this endeavor is the realization that a rigid, one-size-fits-
all version of deference defined by a rigid, two-step algorithm may
never have been realistic or appropriate for the myriad contexts in
which courts review legal interpretations by the administrative state.
That does not mean we should throw up our hands. It means we need
to look much more closely. Sometimes there may be a good deal of
wisdom hidden in the Court's apparent inconsistency. The large body
of administrative cases in which the Court had the opportunity to
apply deference should be understood as the Court's testing ground
for the Chevron doctrine. Scholars and practitioners should pay
attention to the test results.
130. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of
Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 93 (2011).
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